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Notice Provisions in Insurance Contracts: Great American Insurance Co. v.
C. G. Tate Construction Co.
In Great American Insurance Co. v. C. G. Tate Construction Co.,' the
North Carolina Supreme court considered whether an insurer has to
prove that it was prejudiced by the insured's failure to comply with a
notice provision in an insurance policy before the insurer can deny its
duty to defend and indemnify. In this declaratory judgment suit,2 the
Supreme Court held that an unexcused delay in giving notice of poten-
tial liability does not relieve the insurer of its obligations, unless the
delay materially prejudices the insurer's ability to investigate Al-
though many jurisdictions have adopted a similar rule, this decision
overrules a long line of North Carolina cases holding that compliance
with such notice provisions is a condition precedent to coverage and
that failure to comply strictly with the condition precedent releases the
insurer from its obligation under the insurance contract.4
An insurance contract usually includes a notice provision that re-
quires the insured to notify of potential liability, during a specified pe-
riod of time, to give the insurance company an opportunity to
investigate and defend the claims. These provisions have been held to
be reasonable, valid, and enforceable. Generally, such provisions re-
quire the insured to file written notice of a claim "as soon as practica-
ble." In interpreting notice provisions, courts employ at least three
major approaches.' Some jurisdictions require strict contractual com-
pliance, treating notice provisions as conditions precedent, when they
are so labeled in the contract. 6 Some courts have held that the require-
1. 303 N.C. 387, 279 S.E.2d 769 (1981).
2. Generally, these cases reach the court when an insured or an injured third party brings
suit and the insurer refuses to defend and indemnify. In Tate, the insurer initiated the action. See
Comment, The Materiality of Preudice to the Insurer as a Result of the Insured's Failure to Give
Timely Notice, 74 DICK. L. REV. 260 (1970).
3. 303 N.C. at 399, 279 S.E.2d at 771.
4. Eg., Fleming v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 303, 134 S.E.2d 614 (1964);
Muncie v. Travelers Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E.2d 474 (1960); Peeler v. United States Cas. Co.,
197 N.C. 286, 148 S.E. 261 (1929). A condition precedent is one that is to be performed before the
agreement becomes effective, and which calls for the happening of some event or the performance
of some act after the terms of the contract have been agreed on and before the contract shall be
binding on the parties. 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 321 (1964).
5. Annot., 18 A.L.R. 2d 443 (1951).
6. Eg., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 357 So. 2d 968 (Ala. 1978); Preferred Acc. Ins. Co.
v. Castellano, 148 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1945) (Conn.); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. J.B. Forrest & Sons,
133 Ga. App. 864, 212 S.E.2d 497 (1975); Viani v. Aetna Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 22, 501 P.2d 706
(1972); INA Ins. Co. v. Chicago, 62 Ill. App. 3d 80, 379 N.E.2d 34 (1978); National Sur. Co. v.
Dotson, 270 F.2d 460 (6th Ci. 1959) (Ky.); Security Ins. Group v. Emery, 272 A.2d 736 (Me.
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ment of notice is "important" to the contract and results in an implied
condition precedent, even when it is not labeled as a condition prece-
dent. There is some conflict as to the effect to be given an implied
condition precedent. In some cases, implied conditions are treated as if
they were express, and the insurer can escape its obligations under the
contract without showing prejudice.' In many other cases in which the
provision is not labeled an express condition, courts use this opportu-
nity to require the insurer to prove prejudice by the delay.8
Two other approaches use prejudice as an important concept in or-
der to avoid the harsh results of the contractual theories. One line of
cases provides that prejudice may be or should be considered in decid-
ing whether the delay by the insured was reasonable.9 These courts
focus on the phrase "as soon as practicable," interpreting it to mean as
soon as reasonably possible under the circumstances.' 0 In determining
this factual question juries must consider the length of delay by the
insured, the reasons for the delay, and the prejudice to the insurer."
Another approach requires that the insurer show its ability to investi-
gate and defend has been prejudiced by the failure of the insured to
give notice, as required under the contract. 2
1971); Rose v. Regan, - Mass. -, 181 N.E.2d 796 (1962); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Caccin-
nell, - Nev. -, 216 P.2d 606 (1950); Gizzi v. State Farm Ma. Ins. Co., 56 App. Div. 2d 973, 393
N.Y.S.2d 107 (1977); Crumley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 225 Tenn. 667, 475 S.W.2d 654 (1970);
Shelton v. Ray, 570 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Zinman v. Employers Ins. Co., 493 F.2d
196 (2d Cir. 1974) (Vt.); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Wilkerson, 119 F. Supp. 383 (Va. 1954), afl'd, 210
F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1954).
7. E.g., Barfield v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 59 Tenn. App. 631, 443 S.W.2d 482 (1968), cert.
denied, (1969); Christensten v. Allstate Ins. Co., 29 Misc. 2d 671, 218 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct.
1961).
8. E.g., Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Ariz. Concrete Co., 47 Ariz. 420, 56 P.2d 188 (1936).
9. These states support an intermediate standard by allowing prejudice to be a factor in
determining the reasonableness of the delay. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co. v. Oliver, 115 N.H. 141,
335 A.2d 666 (1975); Bibb v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 205 N.W.2d 495 (Mich. App. 1973); St. Paul Fire
and Marine Ins. Co. v. Wabash Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 637 (D. Minn. 1967).
10. E.g., American Fidelity Co. v. Schemel, 103 N.H. 190, 193, 168 A.2d 478, 480 (1961).
11. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co. v. Oliver, 115 N.H. 141, 335 A.2d 666 (1975).
12. E.g., Globe Indem. Co. v. Blomfield, 115 Ariz. 5, 562 P.2d 1372 (1977); Hope Spoke Co.
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 102 Ark. 1, 143 S.W. 85 (1912); Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 60 Cal. 2d
303, 384 P.2d 155 (1963); Barnes v. Waco Scaffolding & Equip. Co., - Colo. -, 589 P.2d 505
(1978); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 320 A.2d 345 (Del. 1974); Torres v. Protective Nat'l
Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rynearson, 507 F.2d 573
(7th Cir. 1974) (Ind.); Henschel v. Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co., 178 N.W.2d 409 (Iowa 1970); O'Neal v.
Southern Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 325 So. 2d 887 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v.
Harvey, 278 Md. 548, 366 A.2d 13 (1976); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Bowes, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh.
1831, 409 N.E.2d 185 (1980); Wendel v. Swanberg, 384 Mich. 468, 185 N.W.2d 348 (1971); Sager
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 461 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. 1971); Rampy v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 278 So. 2d 428 (Miss. 1973); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murnion, 439 F.2d 945
(9th Cir. 1971) (Mont.); Traush v. Knecht, 184 Neb. 134, 165 N.W.2d 738 (1969), vacated on other
grounds, 184 Neb. 511, 169 N.W.2d 269 (1969); Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51
NJ. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968); Mountainair Mun. Schools v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 80
N.M. 761, 461 P.2d 410 (1969); Automobile Club Ins. Co. v. Hoffert, 195 N.W.2d 542 (N.D. 1972);
2
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C.G. Tate Construction Company (Tate) was insured by Great
American Insurance Company (Great American). An accident oc-
curred on April 6, 1978 on U.S. Highway 221 in South Carolina be-
tween an automobile driven by Norma Jean Pegg and a gasoline truck
driven by Robert Allen Thomas and owned by Space Petroleum, Inc.
At the time of the collision, Tate was engaged in a highway expansion
project on U.S. 221.1
The cause of the accident, the path of the vehicles, and Great Ameri-
can's liability were strongly disputed. Both drivers and one other mo-
torist who witnessed the accident claimed that Pegg was traveling south
and Thomas was travelling north. Tate's front-end loader then backed
out onto the highway causing the tanker to swerve left of the center line
and collide head on with the automobile. Several of Tate's employees
and one other eyewitness testified that both vehicles were traveling
north, and that when the car driven by Pegg slowed or stopped, the
tanker braked, jackknifed, and rolled over the car. These witnesses
claimed that Tate's front-end loader was parked off the road approxi-
mately ten feet and was not involved in the accident. The local news
media and the investigating officer accepted the drivers' version that
Tate was responsible. 4
Great American was not notified of the accident until twenty-seven
days later when Thomas, the tanker driver, filed for workers' compen-
sation through his employer. Great American was the workers' com-
pensation carrier for Space Petroleum, Inc. 5 Tate's officers testified
that they did not give notice to Great American because its employees
who witnessed the accident stated Tate was not involved. Tate did not
know of its potential involvement until it received the summons and
complaint in this action from Great American. 6
The trial court found that Tate "knew or in the exercise of ordinary
and reasonable prudence should have known" that the accident might
"result in a claim being made against it," and that the failure to give
notice of the accident to the insured "as soon as practicable," required
by the policy, was not justified or excusable.' 7 The conclusions reached
Zurich Ins. Co. v. Valley Steel Erectors, 13 Ohio App. 41, 233 N.E.2d 597 (1968); Lusch v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 272 Or. 593, 538 P.2d 902 (1975); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371
A.2d 193 (1977); Pickering v. American Employers Ins. Co., 109 R.I. 143, 282 A.2d 584 (1971);
Whittington v. Ranger Ins. Co., 261 S.C. 582, 201 S.E.2d 620 (1973); Spangler v. Insurance Co. of
N. Am., 17 Wash. App. 121, 562 P.2d 635 (1977); Dietz v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 88
Wis. 496, 276 N.W.2d 808 (1979); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Milam, 438 F. Supp. 227
(D.W.Va. 1977).
13. 303 N.C. at 388, 279 S.E.2d at 770.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 389, 279 S.W.2d at 771.
17. Id.
3
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by the superior court in Tate were squarely based on prior North Caro-
lina cases that held that a contract provision requiring written notice
was a condition precedent to the insurer's obligation to defend and in-
demnify, even though the policy contained no forfeiture clause.'
8
When Tate reached the North Carolina Court of Appeals, 9 the
court, despite precedent to the contrary, felt compelled by reasons of
policy to require the insurer to prove how it had been prejudiced by the
insured's delay in giving notice. The court of appeals held that before
the insurance company can be relieved of its obligations under the con-
tract, "the finder of the facts must determine: (1) Was notice given
within a reasonable time considering all the facts and circumstances of
the particular case and (2) if not, has the insurer suffered prejudice
from the insured's delay in giving notice?"2
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed and modified the hold-
ing of the court of appeals and outlined a three step test:
When faced with a claim that notice was not timely given, the trier of
fact must first decide whether the notice was given as soon as practica-
ble. If not, the trier of fact must decide whether the insured has shown
that he acted in good faith, e.g., that he had not actual knowledge that a
claim might be filed against him. If the good faith test is met the bur-
den then shifts to the insurer to show that is ability to investigate and
defend was materially prejudiced by the delay.2'
There are two major differences between these two tests. The supreme
court requires the insured to demonstrate good faith in his delay as a
prerequisite to reaching the issue of prejudice, an intermediate step not
required by the lower court. Once the insured has demonstrated good
faith, the insurer must prove material prejudice, a concept not found in
the court of appeals' test.
The supreme court's rationale was similar to that of other courts ad-
18. Peeler v. United States Cas. Co., 197 N.C. 286, 148 S.E.2d 261 (1929). See Fleming v.
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 303, 134 S.E.2d 614 (1964); Muncie v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E.2d 474 (1960). In Peeler, the plaintiff was a judgment creditor of an insured
motorist whose insurance company denied liability because notice was not given until several
months after the accident. The contract, in a paragraph designated "Condition C," required that
written notice of any accident as soon as practicable. The court held that although the contract
did not expressly provide for forfeiture, timely written notice was a condition precedent to the
insured's right to recovery, and therefore plaintiffs action was barred. 197 N.C. at 289-90, 148
S.E. at 262-63. In Muncie, the contract required written notice as soon as practicable and, in
another paragraph, stated that the insurance company would not be liable unless, as a condition
precedent, the insured complied fully with all terms of the policy. The court held that notice given
eight months after an accident, without any explanation or justification for the delay, was not
given "as soon as practicable." The condition not having been met, the action could not be main-
tained. 253 N.C. at 82, 116 S.E.2d at 479.
19. Great American Ins. Co. v. Tate Construction Co., 46 N.C. App. 427, 265 S.E.2d 467
(1980).
20. Id. at 436, 265 S.E.2d at 473. A discussion of the court of appeals decision may be found
at 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141 (1981).
21. 303 N.C. at -, 279 S.E.2d at 776.
4
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hering to the modem trend away from the application of the strict con-
tract law.22 Courts have traditionally honored the freedom to contract
and have enforced insurance policies as written, when they were unam-
biguous. Recently, however, the trend has been to distinguish insur-
ance contracts from other types of contracts because the monetary
amount of coverage is frequently the only term negotiated by the par-
ties. Typical of this trend is Brakeman v. Potomac Insurance Co.23 Al-
though the policy contained a notice provision designated as a
condition precedent, the court required the insurance company to
prove both a breach of the notice provision and prejudice.2 4 The ma-
jority of the North Carolina court felt that the new rule would give
effect to the real expectations of the parties, without affecting the risk
assumed by the insurer or its ability to investigate claims.
2 5
The court also reasoned that interpretation of the notice provision
should be guided by its purpose, not by a conclusive term.26 The
supreme court agreed with the court of appeals that the purpose of the
notice provision was to furnish the insurer with a timely opportunity to
adequately investigate. If the insurer has not been materially
prejudiced in its investigation, then the insurer should perform its
obligation. 7
The North Carolina court then turned to a New Jersey Supreme
Court case28 that concentrated on the public policy supporting this de-
cision. The language of the contract may classify the notice provision
as a condition precedent; however, what is involved is a forfeiture. The
insured is denied what he paid for. Adoption of the modem trend pro-
motes the social function of insurance because it maintains the reason-
able expectations of the insured that the insurer will defend and
indemnify. The insurer's expectations are not altered because its obli-
gation is to the insured, unless materially prejudiced by the insured's
delay in notification. 29 The broader aspect of public policy is that inno-
cent victims of negligence Will be compensated for their injuries, and
the court should weigh these third party interests in determining
whether to allow the forfeiture.3 0
22. The court relied primarily upon two decisions of other state supreme courts, Cooper v.
Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968) and Brakeman v. Potomac Ins.
Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977).
23. 472 Pa. 66, 31 A.2d 193 (1977).
24. Id. at 72, 371 A.2d at 196.
25. 303 N.C. at 395-96, 279 S.E.2d at 774. Justice Meyer, in his dissent, disagreed with the
majority on this point.
26. Id. at 397, 279 S.E.2d at 774.
27. Id. at 396, 279 S.E.2d at 774.
28. Cooper v. Government Employees Inc. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968).
29. 303 N.C. at 397, 279 S.E.2d at 774 (citing Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51
NJ. 86, 93-94, 237 A.2d 870, 873-74 (1968)).
30. 303 N.C. at 398, 279 S.E.2d at 774.
5
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While overruling the old law of strict interpretation of conditions in
insurance contracts, the court retained the common law principle that
each party to a contract must act in good faith. Expressly placing this
burden on the insured, the court stated "we also now impose the re-
quirement that any period of delay beyond the limits of timeliness be
shown by the insured to have been in good faith.31 In the three-step test
propounded by the supreme court, the insured bears the burden of
showing good faith-before the burden of proving material prejudice
shifts to the insurer. A bad faith delay by the insured releases the in-
surer from its obligations.32
If the insured meets the good faith test, there is a split of authority
among jurisdictions as to who should bear the burden of proving
prejudice. Some courts have placed the burden on the insured because
he is seeking relief under the contract based on a variation of its
terms.3 3 Others place the burden on the party seeking to escape its con-
tractual obligation.34 Still others require the insured to overcome a
presumption that the insurance company has been prejudiced.35
in Tate, the North Carolina Supreme Court chose what it labeled as
the "sounder rule" and placed the burden on the insurer.36 The court
said that this rule would encourage prompt investigation by the insurer
in order to protect its interests, and would, by implication, decrease the
number of lawsuits. In addition, the insurer is in a better position to
prove prejudice because it knows what factors will prejudice its
position.37
Whether the insurer had been prejudiced is a question of fact.3 8 The
court of appeals listed factors to be considered by the trier of fact in
determining this question, and the supreme court adopted this illustra-
tive, non-exclusive list:
[T]he availability of witnesses to the accident; the ability to discover
other information regarding the conditions of the locale where the acci-
dent occurred; any physical changes in the location of the accident dur-
ing the period of the delay; the existence of official reports concerning
the occurrence; the preparation and preservation of demonstrative and
illustrative evidence, such as the vehicles involved in the occurence, or
31. Id. at 399, 279 S.E.2d at 776.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 397, 279 S.E.2d at 775. E.g., Zurich Ins. Co. v. Valley Steel Erectors, 233 N.E.2d
597 (1968); Henderson v. Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co., 252 Iowa 97, 106 N.W.2d 86 (1960).
34. See e.g., Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 320 A.2d 345 (Del. 1974); Cooper v. Government Employees Ins.
Co., 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968).
35. E.g., Laster v. United States Fid. Guar. Co., 293 So. 2d 83 (Fla. App. 1974); Dairyland
Ins. Co. v. Cummingham, 360 F. Supp. 139 (D. Colo. 1973).
36. 303 N.C. at 398, 279 S.E.2d at 775.
37. Id. at 398, 279 S.E.2d at 775-76.
38. 46 N.C.App. 427, 265 S.E.2d 467, 473 (1980).
6
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photographs and diagrams of the scene; the ability of experts to recon-
struct the scene and the occurence; and so on.
3 9
The court was quick to point out that the insurer must prove not only
one or more of the above factors, but that "changed circumstances ma-
terially impairs its ability to investigate the claim or defend and, thus,
to prepare a viable defense."40 Overall development in this area will be
on a case-by-case basis and the outcome will be determined by the ap-
plication of these factors to a particular fact situation.4
The full ramifications of the Tate decision will not be known for
many years. Tate resolves the inconsistencies between the Peeler-
Muncie-Fleming42 line of cases, which adhered to the strict contractual
theory, and the Rhyne and Ball4 3 line of cases, which carved out excep-
tions to that rule by defining excusable or justifiable delay. From the
perspective of the insured or an injured third party, the decision is a
positive one. Tate alleviates the inequities of the old approach and al-
lows a factual inquiry in all cases. Under Tate the insured will receive
his benefit of the bargain more often than before. The North Carolina
Supreme Court chose to overturn old law rather than to distinguish it.
This decision clarifies prior inconsistencies and corrects the inequities
by protecting and promoting the expectations of both parties.
The weight of authority is with the modem trend of requiring the
insurer to defend and indemnify unless he has been materially
prejudiced by the delay of the insured in giving notice.' Jurisdictions
that have used this approach appear to find it both workable and satis-
factory. North Carolina has deviated from the trend only by stating
expressly a standard generally implied, that of good faith. Setting forth
numerous reasons for the change in the law, the court appeared to fo-
cus on correcting the tilt of the unbalanced scale: "The rule we adopt
today has the advantages of promoting social policy and fulfilling the
reasonable expectations of the purchaser while fully protecting the abil-
ity of the insurer to protect its own interests."45
WANDA NAYLOR
39. 303 N.C. at 398, 279 S.E.2d at 776 (quoting 46 N.C. App. at 437, 265 S.E.2d at 473).
40. Id. at 398-99, 279 S.E.2d at 776.
41. Id. at 399, 279 S.E.2d at 776.
42. Peeler v. United States Cas. Co., 197 N.C. 286, 148 S.E.2d 261 (1929); Muncie v. Travel-
ers Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E.2d 474 (1960); Fleming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 261 N.C.
303, 134 S.E.2d 614 (1964).
43. Rhyne v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 196 N.C. 717, 147 S.E. 6 (1929). Ball v. Em-
ployer's Assur. Corp., 206 N.C. 90, 172 S.E. 878 (1934).
44. 303 N.C. at 394, 279 S.E.2d at 773.
45. 303 N.C. at 395, 279 S.E.2d at 774.
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